Hudson v. Palmer: Throwing Away the Keys to Prisoners\u27 Privacy and Due Process Rights by Hartmann, Robert M.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
12-1-1985
Hudson v. Palmer: Throwing Away the Keys to
Prisoners' Privacy and Due Process Rights
Robert M. Hartmann
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert M. Hartmann, Hudson v. Palmer: Throwing Away the Keys to Prisoners' Privacy and Due Process Rights, 19 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 551
(1985).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol19/iss2/7
HUDSON v. PALMER: THROWING AWAY THE
KEYS TO PRISONERS' PRIVACY AND DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS
I. INTRODUCTION
"There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the
prisons of this country."1 Nevertheless, prison inmates have long been
considered to possess fewer rights than the average citizen. In recent
years, the United States Supreme Court has granted prison inmates lim-
ited constitutional rights including: (1) the right to be free from racial
discrimination;2 (2) the right to petition the courts for redress of their
grievances;3 (3) the right to freedom of religion;4 (4) the right to due
process;5 and (5) the right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual
punishment.6
Hudson v. Palmer7 presented the Court with the opportunity to add
the right of privacy to these rights cited by Chief Justice Burger in Wolff
v. McDonnell.' The Hudson Court, however, rejected Palmer's claim
1. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974). For a discussion of Wolff, see infra
note 5.
2. Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3198 (1984) (citing Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S.
333, 334 (1968) (per curiam) (Alabama statutes requiring racial segregation in Alabama pris-
ons found unconstitutional)).
3. Id. (citing Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 489-90 (1969) (Tennessee prison regulation
prohibiting prisoners from assisting other inmates in preparation of writs found unconstitu-
tional because it violated inmates' right to petition for federal habeas corpus relief)).
4. Id. (citing Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (per curiam) (prison administration's
prohibition of Buddhist inmate's use of prison chapel, while not prohibiting other inmates with
more conventional religious beliefs from using the chapel, found unconstitutional)).
5. Id. (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974)). In Wolff, the prisoner
brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging prison disciplinary proceedings violated inmates'
due process rights. The Court found that to satisfy due process, prison disciplinary proceed-
ings must provide: (1) advance written notice of the charges against an inmate; (2) a written
statement by the factfinders identifying the evidence relied upon to invoke disciplinary action;
and (3) the opportunity for an inmate to call witnesses and present evidence in his defense.
Because these rights were not granted in Wolff, the inmates' right to due process was violated.
Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558-59.
6. Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3198 (1984) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
104 (1976) (deliberate indifference of prison personnel in treatment of inmate's injury violates
eighth amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment and is actionable under
§ 1983 (1976))).
7. 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984).
8. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
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that prisoners are entitled to a right of privacy.9 Due to the need for
institutional security, the Court found that inmates have no fourth
amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches.' 0 Additionally,
the Court held that the intentional deprivation of an inmate's property,
where no pre-deprivation hearing took place, did not violate the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment, since the state provided a
"meaningful"" remedy to the prisoner. 2
With Hudson, the Burger Court has taken another step in narrowing
the scope of the fourth and fourteenth amendments' privacy and due pro-
cess protections. 13 This Note examines the Court's application of a se-
curity-privacy balancing test to the circumstances surrounding the
search of a prisoner's cell. The security-privacy balancing test used in
Hudson will result in law enforcement officials interpreting the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment more narrowly."' This Note
also examines whether Parratt v. Taylor,"' where the Court held that a
negligent deprivation of an inmate's property did not violate the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment provided that meaningful state
remedies were available to the inmate, is applicable to the intentional
deprivation suffered by Palmer.
This Note concludes that the Court erred in finding that inmates are
not protected from unreasonable searches and seizures by the fourth and
fourteenth amendments.
II. STATEMENT OF CASE
Russell T. Palmer was incarcerated at the Bland Correctional
Center in Bland, Virginia after a conviction of forgery, uttering, grand
larceny and bank robbery.' 6 On September 16, 1981, petitioner Hudson,
along with other prison guards, conducted a "shakedown" search of
9. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3202.
10. Id. at 3201.
11. Id. at 3204-05. A "meaningful" remedy was defined by the Court as one that provides
an inmate with fair opportunity to present his claim of property deprivation before a state
tribunal. Id. at 3203.
12. Id. For a discussion of the adequacy of Virginia remedies, see infra notes 75-83 and
accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 197-99 & 202-29 and accompanying text. For pertinent text of the
fourth amendment, see infra note 20. For pertinent text of the fourteenth amendment, see
infra note 21.
14. See infra notes 229-32 and accompanying text. For pertinent text of the fourteenth
amendment, see infra note 21.
15. 451 U.S. 527 (1981). For a full discussion of Parratt, see infra note 203-06 and accom-
panying text.
16. Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3196 (1984).
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Palmer's cell.17 The search was not part of a pre-authorized search pro-
gram. The officers discovered, seized and destroyed a quantity of
Palmer's noncontraband personal property, including legal materials and
letters.18
Palmer subsequently brought an action against Hudson in the
United States District Court for the District of Virginia pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regu-
lation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory... subjects
... any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law .... 
19
Palmer asserted two claims. First, he argued that the search by Hudson,
conducted solely to harass and humiliate Palmer, violated his fourth
amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.2°
Additionally, Palmer argued that Hudson's seizufe and destruction of his
noncontraband personal property, done without the prior approval of the
prison administration, constituted a violation of Palmer's fourteenth
amendment right not to be deprived of personal property without due
process of law.21
The district court granted summary judgment in Hudson's favor.
Having acknowledged that the search was conducted solely to harass and
humiliate Palmer, and that the 'status of the property destroyed was non-
17. Id. A "shakedown" search involves a thorough, often violent search of an inmate's
cell, usually for contraband. Commonly, a prisoner's possessions may be littered on the jail
floor, and his mattress may be ripped during the search.
18. Id. at 3208. Contraband is an illegal object or substance. Under no authority may it
be argued that Palmer's letters and legal materials were contraband. See infra notes 130-32
and accompanying text.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Palmer argued that the violation of his right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures pursuant to the fourth amendment and his right not to be
deprived of his property without due process of law pursuant to the fourteenth amendment
could be remedied by application of § 1983. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3197.
20. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3198. The fourth amendment provides, in pertinent part, that
"[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons.., against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated.., but upon probable cause .. " U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Palmer's claim was based on Hudson's motives for the search, which Palmer argued were
based not on probable cause, but rather on Hudson's desire to harass and humiliate Palmer.
Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3197.
21. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3197. The fifth amendment provides, in pertinent part, that
"any State [shall not] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.... ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Palmer contended that the prison administration
should have conducted a pre-deprivation hearing in order to allow him the right to answer
allegations concerning contraband in his cell. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3204.
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contraband,22 the court nevertheless entered summary judgment against
Palmer.23 Additionally, the court found that the destruction of Palmer's
property did not violate the fourteenth amendment due process clause
because Virginia provided adequate tort remedies to redress the
deprivation.24
The Fourth Circuit reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded
for further proceedings.25 The Fourth Circuit reversed the district
court's finding as to Palmer's fourth amendment claim. Having found
that inmates enjoy a "limited privacy right" in their cells against searches
conducted solely to harass or humiliate,26 the court concluded that sum-
mary judgment was inappropriate and remanded the case to the district
court to determine the cause of the search.27
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that
Palmer's fourteenth amendment due process right was not violated.28
The court acknowledged that the logic of Parratt v. Taylor29 applied to
intentional as well as negligent deprivations of an inmate's property30
where adequate post-deprivation remedies were available to the inmate.
31
The Supreme Court granted Hudson's petition for a writ of certio-
22. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3197.
23. Id. As to the fourth amendment claim, Palmer acknowledged that had his case in-
volved contraband rather than legal property, the analysis would have been different. In such
a case, a guard would likely have preestablished authority to seize the contraband. Moreover,
the prisoner's legitimate expectation of privacy would have been absent whereas the govern-
ment's interest in immediate seizure might be strong. Brief for Respondent and Cross-Peti-
tioner at 7 n.5, Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984).
24. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3197. See VA. CODE § 8.01-195.1 et seq. (Supp. 1985) for Vir-
ginia remedies.
25. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3197 (citing Palmer v. Hudson, 697 F.2d 1220, 1220 (4th Cir.
1983)). To date, the Fourth Circuit has not reconsidered the issues remanded to it by the
Supreme Court.
26. Palmer, 697 F.2d at 1225. The court reasoned that since the primary purpose of the
fourth and fourteenth amendments is to provide all citizens, even those in prison, the freedom
from unreasonable searches and seizures, Palmer enjoyed a limited privacy right against the
type of search conducted by Hudson. Id. The court implied that had Hudson's "shakedown"
search been conducted pursuant to a legitimate program authorizing random searches of in-
mates' cells, it may have reached the opposite conclusion. Id. at 1224-25.
27. Palmer, 697 F.2d at 1225. See also Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3198.
28. Palmer, 697 F.2d at 1223.
29. 451 U.S. at 527 (1981). For a full discussion of Parratt, see infra notes 203-06 and
accompanying text.
30. Palmer, 697 F.2d at 1223. "[O]nce it is assumed that a postdeprivation remedy can
cure an unintentional but negligent act causing injury, inflicted by a state agent which is
unamenable to prior review, then that principle applies as well to random and unauthorized
intentional acts." Id. The court reasoned that there was no way for a prison administration to
predict when its guards might conduct "personal vendettas" against prisoners. Thus, the only
practical mechanism to prevent seizures of property was to punish guards after the seizure. Id.
31. Id. See also Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3197. The court of appeals did not discuss the
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rar and affirmed the district court's finding for Hudson on both the
fourth and fourteenth amendment claims.32
III. REASONING OF THE COURT
A. The Plurality Opinion
1. Fourth amendment claim
In Hudson v. Palmer, the Court began its discussion by addressing
the issue of constitutional limitations of rights granted to inmates. The
Court stated that while prisoners retain "many protections of the Consti-
tution, it is also clear that imprisonment carries with it the circumscrip-
tion or loss of many significant rights.",33 Two reasons were cited by the
Court. First, the curtailment of rights may be necessary to accommodate
a myriad of "institutional needs and objectives,"'34 chief among which is
internal security.35 Second, restrictions on an inmate's rights serve "as
reminders that, under our system of justice, deterrence and retribution
are factors in addition to correction."
36
The Court then addressed the question of privacy. To determine
whether Palmer enjoyed the fourth amendment right to be free from un-
reasonable searches, Chief Justice Burger stated that Palmer must show
that he had "a 'justifiable,' a 'reasonable,' or a 'legitimate expectation of
privacy' that has been invaded by government action."
37
availability and adequacy of existing Virginia remedies. Rather, it accepted the district court's
statement as to the existence of remedies pursuant to Virginia law.
32. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3197.
33. Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3199 (1984) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
545-46 (1979) (held that the following correctional center policies did not violate the first,
fourth or fifth amendment: (1) housing two inmates in rooms designed for one; (2) prohibiting
inmates from receiving certain books not mailed from publishers, book clubs or bookstores;
(3) prohibiting inmates' receipt of packages of food and personal items from outside the insti-
tution; (4) conducting body-cavity searches of inmates following contact visits with visitors;
and (5) requiring pretrial detainees to remain outside their cells during inspections)).
34. Id. (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974)). For a discussion of Wolff,
see supra note 5.
35. Id. (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823 (1974) (prison regulation prohibiting
inmate interviews with media, enacted due to correctional authorities' belief that such inter-
views contributed to prison violence, not violative of prisoners' right of free speech)).
36. Id.
37. Id. (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 745 (1979) (telephone user did not
have legitimate expectation of privacy regarding telephone number he dialed)). See also Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Katz was convicted of transmitting wagering informa-
tion by telephone. The evidence against him included recordings of his telephone conversa-
tions. The Court found that since Katz intentionally concealed his voice from the public, he
had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the spoken words. Id. at 352-53. In his concurring
opinion, Justice Harlan detailed his understanding of the rule regarding whether an individual
has a fourth amendment right of privacy: "there is a twofold requirement, first that a person
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For Palmer to succeed, Chief Justice Burger stated that society must
be willing to acknowledge that prison inmates have a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy.3" The Chief Justice found that society was not prepared
to recognize even a limited privacy right for inmates.39 Accordingly,
"the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches
does not apply within the confines of the prison cell."'' Thus, the Chief
Justice found that because society was not willing to recognize a privacy
right for inmates, Palmer did not have a "reasonable" expectation of
privacy.
4 l
Additionally, the Chief Justice noted that privacy rights for prison-
ers are incompatible with security needs of the institution.42 He argued
that "[tihe recognition of privacy rights for prisoners in their individual
cells simply cannot be reconciled with the concept of incarceration and
the needs and objectives of penal institutions." 3 Because Palmer had no
reasonable expectation of privacy, the Court rejected the Fourth Circuit's
finding that Palmer enjoyed a limited privacy right.'
In reaching his conclusion, Chief Justice Burger explored the nature
of prisons and prisoners. He stated:
Prisons, by definition, are places of involuntary confine-
ment of persons who have a demonstrated proclivity for antiso-
cial criminal, and often violent, conduct. Inmates have
necessarily shown a lapse in ability to control and conform
their behavior to the legitimate standards of society by the nor-
mal impulses of self-restraint; they have shown an inability to
regulate their conduct in a way that reflects either a respect for
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation
be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concur-
ring).
Justice Harlan stressed the controlling importance of the second requirement in United
States v. White: "[t]he analysis must... transcend the search for subjective expectations....
[WMe should not, as judges, merely recite the expectations and risks without examining the
desirability of saddling them upon society." United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786
(Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan seemed to imply that the function of the Court was to
determine objectively the desirability of giving prisoners a right of privacy. In Hudson, Chief
Justice Burger interpreted Justice Harlan's second requirement to mean that society's wishes
should be taken into account before imposing risks upon society. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3199
n.7. By looking to society's wishes instead of using an objective standard, Chief Justice Bur-
ger's conclusion may be a misapplication of Justice Harlan's analysis in White.
38. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3199.
39. Id. at 3201.
40. Id. at 3200.
41. Id. at 3201-02.
42. Id. at 3200.
43. Id.
44.A. at 3201-02.
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law or an appreciation of the rights of others.4 5
The Chief Justice further stated that "prison administrators are to take
all necessary steps to ensure the safety of not only the prison staffs and
administration personnel, but visitors [as well]. They are under an obli-
gation to ... guarantee the safety of the inmates .... "" Chief Justice
Burger identified two separate, and in his view mutually exclusive institu-
tional goals. One was to grant inmates rights which did not jeopardize
institutional security;47 the second goal was to allow prison officials the
means to guarantee prison security.48 The result, according to the Chief
Justice, was to deny prisoners the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures:
it would be literally impossible to accomplish the prison objec-
tives . . .if inmates retained a right of privacy in their cells.
Virtually the only place inmates can conceal weapons, drugs,
and other contraband is in their cells. Unfettered access to
these cells by prison officials, thus, is imperative if drugs and
contraband are to be ferreted out and sanitary surroundings are
to be maintained. 9
The Court's conclusion differed from that reached by the Fourth
Circuit.5" The Fourth Circuit was troubled by maliciously motivated
searches." Chief Justice Burger took issue with the Fourth Circuit's
45. Id. at 3200. Chief Justice Burger continued:
[d]uring 1981 and the first half of 1982, there were over 120 prisoners murdered by
fellow inmates in state and federal prisons. A number of prison personnel were mur-
dered by prisoners during this period. Over 29 riots or similar disturbances were
reported in these facilities for the same time frame.... [D]uring 1983, there were 11
inmate homicides, 359 inmate assaults on other inmates, 227 inmate assaults on
prison staff, and 10 suicides.
Id. The amount of violence cited by the Chief Justice was essential to his argument that the
security needs of the institution were incompatible with a right of privacy. Chief Justice Bur-
ger seemed to imply that because some prisoners were violent, no prisoners could be trusted
with even a limited privacy right. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
46. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3200.
47. Id. Chief Justice Burger stated that "the two interests here are the interest of society
in the security of its penal institutions and the interest of the prisoner in privacy within his
cell." Id.
48. Id. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
49. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3200. In balancing the two interests of institutional security and
a prisoner's right of privacy, the Chief Justice stated that "[wie strike the balance in favor of
institutional security, which we have noted is 'central to all other corrections goals ....... Id.
at 3201 (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823 (1974) (prison regulation prohibiting in-
mate interviews with media, enacted due to correctional authorities' belief that such interviews
contributed to prison violence, not violative of prisoners' right of free speech)).
50. For the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in finding that Palmer enjoyed a limited privacy
right, see supra note 26.
51. Palmer v. Hudson, 697 F.2d 1220, 1224 (1983).
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conclusion that a limited privacy right would protect against this type of
search. 2 The Chief Justice agreed that maliciously motivated searches
were a possibility and that searches done purely to harass should not be
tolerated.13 However, he maintained that a limited privacy right was not
the solution. 4 Rather, the Chief Justice reasoned that eliminating the
privacy right would subject inmates to periodic searches, the timing of
which would be unknown to the prisoner, and added that "[t]he uncer-
tainty that attends random searches of cells renders these searches per-
haps the most effective weapon of the prison administrator in the
constant fight against the proliferation of knives and guns, illicit drugs,
and other contraband.
55
Palmer admitted that "shakedown" searches are essential to institu-
tional security.56 However, he argued that since searches motivated by
the guard's desire to harass are unreasonable, an inmate has a reasonable
expectation of privacy not to have his cell searched for such a purpose.5 7
The Court chose not to address this issue. Chief Justice Burger argued
that because prisoners have no reasonable expectation of privacy, the rea-
sonableness of this particular search was not at issue.5 8
The Chief Justice did not conclude that "prison attendants can ride
roughshod over inmates' property rights with impunity."59 Even though
the fourth amendment did not provide a remedy for Palmer, Chief Jus-
tice Burger concluded that the eighth amendment,6° state tort and com-
mon law remedies would be sufficient to redress Palmer's grievances.61
2. Fourteenth amendment claim
Upon concluding that Hudson's search of Palmer's cell did not vio-
late the fourth amendment, the Court then addressed the question of
whether Hudson's intentional deprivation of Palmer's personal property
violated the fourteenth amendment due process clause. In deciding this
52. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3201.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. See also Marrero v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 754, 757, 284 S.E.2d 809, 811 (1981)
(random searches of inmates necessary to ensure security of the institution, safety of inmates
and all others in the institution).
56. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3202. See also Brief for Respondent and Cross-Petitioner at 7
n.5, Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984).
57. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3202.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. For text of eighth amendment, see infra note 127.
61. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3202. To date, none of the alternative remedies suggested by
Chief Justice Burger have compensated Palmer for the loss of his property.
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question, the Chief Justice first discussed the Court's holding in Parratt v.
Taylor.62 In Parratt, the Court found that the negligent deprivation of an
inmate's property did not violate the fourteenth amendment due process
clause because the state provided a meaningful remedy to redress the
prisoner's loss.63 Since the district court granted summary judgment to
Hudson based on Parratt, Chief Justice Burger framed the issue to be
whether Parratt applied to cases of intentional deprivations of an individ-
ual's property."
The Chief Justice reasoned that Parratt stood for the proposition
that where property deprivations were effected through random and un-
authorized acts, pre-deprivation hearings were impossible since the state
could not know when an act of property deprivation will occur.6 5 He
concluded that there is "no logical distinction between negligent and in-
tentional deprivations of property insofar as the 'practicability' of afford-
ing predeprivation process is concerned. The State can no more
anticipate and control in advance the random and unauthorized inten-
tional conduct of its employees that it can anticipate similar negligent
conduct."6 6 The Chief Justice argued that intentional acts of property
deprivation might be even more difficult to anticipate since the guard
could take steps to avoid signalling his intent to deprive an inmate of his
property.67
Since negligent deprivations of property do not violate the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment because pre-deprivation hear-
ings are impracticable, Chief Justice Burger reasoned that intentional
deprivations do not violate the due process clause if a meaningful post-
deprivation remedy is available to the individual.68  Accordingly, the
Court held that "an unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by
a state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural require-
ments of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a
62. Id. (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981)). For a full discussion of Parratt, see
infra notes 203-06 and accompanying text.
63. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3202-03.
64. Id. at 3202. If Parratt applied to intentional deprivations of property as well as negli-
gent deprivations, Palmer's fourteenth amendment due process right would not have been vio-
lated if Virginia provided a sufficient alternative remedy. Id. at 3204.
65. Id. at 3203.
66. Id. The Court reasoned that if the prison administration does not know that a guard is
planning on seizing a prisoner's property, it does not know to hold a hearing. Id. Thus,
requiring pre-deprivation hearings to satisfy due process is impracticable. Id.
67. Id. Chief Justice Burger concluded that the better way to protect the prisoner's right
to his property was to require the state to provide adequate post-deprivation procedures rather
than pre-deprivation procedures. Id. at 3203-04.
68. Id. at 3204.
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meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available."6 9
Palmer contended that because an agent of the state "can provide
pre-deprivation process, then as a matter of due process he must do
so. '' 70 Paraphrasing the Court's holding in Parratt, Chief Justice Burger
responded that:
postdeprivation procedures satisfy due process because the
State cannot possibly know in advance of a negligent depriva-
tion of property. Whether an individual employee himself is
able to foresee a deprivation is simply of no consequence. The
controlling inquiry is solely whether the State is in a position to
provide for predeprivation process.71
Due process, according to Chief Justice Burger, did not depend on the
availability of pre-deprivation process. He reasoned that Palmer's argu-
ment represented a fundamental misunderstanding of Parratt; it was not
sufficient for a violation of the fourteenth amendment due process clause
for Palmer to have shown that the guard could have requested a pre-
deprivation hearing.
Citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,72 Palmer also contended
that Hudson's deliberate destruction of his property constituted a due
process violation despite the availability of post-deprivation remedies.73
Arguing that Logan only applied in situations where the property depri-
vation was pursuant to a state procedure, Chief Justice Burger disagreed.
He stated that Palmer failed to allege that the asserted destruction of his
property occurred pursuant to an established Virginia procedure.74
Having determined that Parratt applied to intentional deprivations
of property, the Court next addressed the issue of whether Virginia pro-
vided Palmer with an adequate post-deprivation remedy for the alleged
69. Id. A violation of due process would occur if the state "refuses to provide a suitable
postdeprivation remedy." Id. See also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977) (corpo-
ral punishment inflicted on students by state officials did not violate fourteenth amendment
due process clause since sufficient post-deprivation remedies were available to students to re-
dress any liberty interest deprivation).
70. Brief for Respondent and Cross-Petitioner at 8 (emphasis in original), Hudson v.
Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984).
71. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3204 (emphasis in original).
72. 455 U.S. 422 (1982). In Logan, the claimant, Logan, brought his claim of wrongful
termination to the attention of the requisite commission within the statutorily allotted time.
The commission, however, failed to act within its allotted time. The Court found that unlike
the situation in Parratt, an established state procedure was responsible for Logan's loss, and
allowed him to recover despite Parratt. For a full discussion of Logan, see infra note 208 and
accompanying text.
73. Brief for Respondent and Cross-Petitioner at 8, Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194
(1984).
74. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3204.
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destruction of his property. Chief Justice Burger accepted the district
court and Fourth Circuit's findings that "several common-law remedies
available to [Palmer] would provide adequate compensation for his prop-
erty loss."75 Palmer, however, argued that relief in a Virginia court "is
far from certain and complete" because the state court might hold that
Hudson, a state employee, was entitled to sovereign immunity.7 6 For
support, Palmer relied on Elder v. Holland,7 7 where the court found that
"a State employee may be held liable for intentional torts." 8 The Chief
Justice rejected Palmer's claim as unpersuasive "speculation,"79 finding
that Elder was unambiguous since Virginia employees did not enjoy im-
munity for their intentional torts." He argued that Virginia "has pro-
vided an adequate post-deprivation remedy for the alleged destruction of
property."8" Thus, the Court found neither a violation of Palmer's
fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches82 nor a
violation of his fourteenth amendment due process right.8 3
B. The Concurring Opinion
In concurring, Justice O'Connor did not address the issue of
"whether a prisoner may recover damages for a malicious deprivation of
property, 8, 4 but rather of what was the appropriate source of the consti-
tutional right protected and the remedy that corresponds to that right.8
75. Id. The Court did not discuss the sufficiency of Virginia remedies. Id.
76. Id. at 3205 (citing Brief for Respondent and Cross-Petitioner at 11, Hudson v. Palmer,
104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984)).
77. 208 Va. 15, 155 S.E.2d 369 (1967); see also Short v. Griffitts, 220 Va. 53, 255 S.E.2d
479 (1979) (school board, athletic director, and baseball coach/buildings and grounds supervi-
sor of high school not entitled to sovereign immunity in tort action).
78. Elder, 208 Va. at 19, 155 S.E.2d at 372 (emphasis added).
79. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3205.
80. Id.
81. Id. For an analysis of the adequacy of Virginia remedies, see infra notes 221-26 and
accompanying text.
82. Id. The Chief Justice did not dispute Justice Stevens' argument that Hudson's actions,
while not violative of the fourth amendment's search clause, did violate the seizure clause.
83. Id.
84. Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3205 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis
in original).
85. The Chief Justice argued that the issues facing the Court were: (1) [w]hether the
fourth amendment protected Palmer from searches conducted solely to harass or humiliate, id.
at 3198, see supra note 37 and accompanying text, and (2) whether Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S.
527 (1981), applied to cases involving intentional property deprivation, Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at
3202, see supra note 64 and accompanying text. Thus, Justice O'Connor argued that "[t]he
issue in this case.., does not concern whether a prisoner may recover damages for a malicious
deprivation of property. Rather, this case decides only what is the appropriate source of the
constitutional right and the remedy that corresponds with it." Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3205
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
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Unlike Chief Justice Burger, Justice O'Connor summarily disposed of the
question of the reasonableness of Hudson's search of Palmer's cell. She
focused on whether Palmer's fourteenth amendment argument stated a
"ripe ' " constitutional claim. 7
Justice O'Connor argued that "all searches and seizures of the con-
tents of an inmate's cell are reasonable.""8 She identified two lines of
cases emphasizing different methods of fourth amendment analysis.
First, Justice O'Connor identified cases which interpreted the fourth
amendment in a case-by-case manner.s9 In these cases, the court
weighed the government's interest in the search against the particular
invasion of privacy and possessory interests in the case to determine the
reasonableness of the search.90 Next, Justice O'Connor noted that the
Court sometimes rejected this balancing test in favor of an approach
"that determines the reasonableness of contested practices in a categori-
cal fashion."'" According to Justice O'Connor, prison cell searches and
86. Id. at 3205-06 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor's use of the term "ripe"
may be misplaced. Black's Law Dictionarystates that "a case is ripe for decision by an appel-
late court if the legal issues involved are clear enough and well enough evolved and presented
so that a clear decision can come out of the case." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1192 (5th ed.
1979). Justice O'Connor reasoned that Palmer would have stated a ripe fourth amendment
claim had he shown that the guard acted unreasonably. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3206
(O'Connor, J., concurring). The showing of a constitutional violation is not a prerequisite to a
"ripe" claim. A "ripe" claim need only contain issues sufficiently evolved such that the court
determines the controversy worthy of adjudication. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1192 (5th ed.
1979).
87. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3205-06 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor's ap-
proach tested the validity of Palmer's argument that the fourteenth amendment protected his
property. Palmer's failure to establish this issue led to Justice O'Connor's conclusion that the
complaint did not state a ripe constitutional claim. Id. at 3207 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
This finding is similar to Chief Justice Burger's framing of the fourteenth amendment issue as
whether Palmer's claim was valid under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or his remedy lay outside the four-
teenth amendment due to the Court's decision in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). See
supra note 64. Both Chief Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor examined the nature of the
§ 1983 remedy.
88. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3206 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
89. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). For a full
discussion of Terry, see infra note 90.
90. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3206 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 17-18 n.15 (1968)). In Terry, petitioner Terry was convicted of carrying a concealed
weapon. Terry had been observed standing on a street corner, occasionally pacing in front of
and looking in a store window. Believing that Terry was preparing to rob the store, the officer
identified himself, searched Terry and found a gun. The Court weighed the governmental
interest in searching Terry against the invasion which the search entailed. Terry, 392 U.S. at
22-26. The Court concluded the search was reasonable under the fourth amendment. Id. at
31.
91. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3206 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 555-60 (1979) (cited supra note 33); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
In Robinson, a District of Columbia police officer stopped Robinson's car and arrested him for
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seizures are appropriate for categorical treatment because the govern-
ment has a "compelling interest ' 92 in prison safety and prison officials
must necessarily rely on ad hoe judgments. 93 Thus, Justice O'Connor
concluded that Hudson's search of Palmer's cell was reasonable.
94
Palmer's allegation that his property was destroyed did not alter
Justice O'Connor's fourth amendment analysis. She argued that the rea-
sonableness of the search and seizure was independent of the disposition
of the property after it had been seized. 95 Thus, "any losses that occur
while the property is in official custody are simply not redressable by
Fourth Amendment litigation." 96
While the fourth amendment did not redress Palmer for the loss of
his property, Justice O'Connor conceded that "[tihe Due Process and
Takings Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments stand directly
in opposition to state action intended to deprive people of their legally
protected property interests. These constitutional protections against the
deprivations of private property do not abate at the time of imprison-
driving without a valid driver's license. Pursuant to police department regulations, Robinson
was placed under full custodial arrest. Subsequent to his arrest, Robinson was searched. Dur-
ing the search, the officer discovered capsules filled with heroin in Robinson's jacket. The
Supreme Court, in reversing the court of. appeals, reinstated the district court's conviction of
Robinson. Id. at 220-24. The Supreme Court held that:
[a] custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion
under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the
arrest requires no additional justification. It is the fact of the lawful arrest which
establishes the authority to search, and we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial
arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement
of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a "reasonable" search under that Amendment.
Id. at 235.
92. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3206 (O'Connor, J., concurring). By using the term "compelling
interest," Justice O'Connor has intejected a standard of review more commonly associated
with the strict scrutiny tests in cases involving racial discrimination. See, eg., Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (segregation of white and black children in public schools held a
violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment). Justice O'Connor did
not make clear why she would impose this standard when the rights of prisoners are at stake.
93. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3206 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also LaFave, "Case-by-
Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup.
Cr. Rnv. 127, 141-45.
94. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3206 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
95. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). According to Justice O'Connor:
if the act of taking possession and the indefinite retention of the property are them-
selves reasonable, the handling of the property while in the government's custody is
not itself of Fourth Amendment concern. The nonprivacy interests protected by the
Fourth Amendment do not extend beyond the right against unreasonable
dispossessions.
Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
96. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Unlike Justice O'Connor, Chief Justice Burger did not
consider whether the fourth amendment provided a remedy to Palmer for the intentional dep-
rivation of his property.
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ment." 97 Essentially she argued that while inmates had no constitutional
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, they did have
some constitutional protection not to be deprived of their property with-
out due process. 98
Justice O'Connor concluded that Palmer's fourteenth amendment
argument failed to state a ripe constitutional claim. 99 She premised her
conclusion on the belief that Palmer was required, in establishing a viola-
tion of the fourteenth amendment due process clause, to show that he
had availed himself of Virginia remedies or proved them inadequate. t°
His failure to do so resulted in a finding that Palmer's due process rights
had not been violated by Hudson's search. 101
Finally, Justice O'Connor took issue with the dissent's argument
that the seizure clause of the fourth amendment provided constitutional
protection of Palmer's property. She reiterated that the fourth amend-
ment is independent of the disposition of an inmate's property, assuming
it was seized pursuant to the requirements of the fourth amendment. 102
The sources of protection, argued Justice O'Connor, were the fifth and
fourteenth amendment due process clauses.I13 Because Palmer failed to
avail himself of Virginia remedies, or successfully prove them inade-
quate,'04 the summary judgments issued by the district court and Fourth
Circuit were proper.10 5
C. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Blackmun, Brennan and Mar-
97. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). The fifth amendment provides, in pertinent part, that
"any person [shall not]... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
98. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3206 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
99. Id. at 3207 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Palmer's alleged failure to avail himself of
Virginia remedies, or to prove them inadequate, is unrelated to whether his claim was ripe for
judgment. For a discussion of what constitutes a ripe claim, see supra note 92. Additionally,
ripeness was not an issue discussed by the Fourth Circuit. As an appellate court, the Supreme
Court in Hudson was limited to issues raised on appeal to the Fourth Circuit. Sup. Ct. R. 15,
414 U.S. 441 (1974).
100. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3207 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S.
527, 537-44 (1981). For a full discussion of Parratt, see infra note 203-06.
101. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3207 (O'Connor, J., concurring). According to Justice
O'Connor, "[w]hen adequate remedies are provided and followed, no uncompensated taking or
deprivation of property without due process can result." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
102. Id. at 3206-07 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
103. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3206-07 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See supra note 97 and
accompanying text.
104. Justice O'Connor did not respond to Palmer's contention that Virginia courts were
unlikely to provide him a meaningful remedy.
105. Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3207 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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shall, dissented in Hudson v. Palmer. Although Justice Stevens agreed
with Chief Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor that the destruction of
Palmer's property did not violate Palmer's "right to procedural due pro-
cess," 1"6 he charged that "Hudson maliciously took and destroyed a
quantity of Palmer's property, including legal materials and letters, for
no reason other than harassment."
'10 7
Unlike the Chief Justice, Justice Stevens argued that inmates retain
a "slight residuum of privacy that... can have [no] more than the most
minimal value."'0 8 In agreeing that the Court was correct in finding that
the imperatives of prison security require random searches, 10 9 Justice
Stevens argued that security needs of the prison do not abate inmates of
all rights. Justice Stevens cited Chief Justice Burger, who had in the past
stated that "[i]t is true that inmates lose many rights when they are law-
fully confined, but they do not lose all civil rights. Inmates in jails, pris-
ons, or mental institutions retain certain fundamental rights of privacy;
they are not like animals in a zoo .... 110
After contending that inmates retain a right of privacy, Justice Ste-
vens next considered whether this privacy right protected a prisoner's
possessory interest in personal property. Unlike Chief Justice Burger,
who argued that the fourth amendment applied strictly to searches,"'
Justice Stevens framed the issue as whether the fourth amendment pro-
tected an inmate's possessory interest in the property seized."
2
According to Justice Stevens, an inmate's privacy interest in his
property differed from his possessory interest in the property. Justice
Stevens cited the Court's decision in United States v. Jacobsen"3 to dis-
106. Id. at 3208 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens agreed with the Court's reasoning
on the issue of whether Hudson's destruction of Palmer's property constituted a violation of
the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a discussion
of the Chief Justice's reasoning, see supra notes 62-83 and accompanying text.
107. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3208 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
108. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
109. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
110. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 5 n.2 (1978) (first
and fourteenth amendments held not to provide news media with a constitutional right of
access to jails superior to that of another person)).
111. For a discussion of Chief Justice Burger's analysis of Palmer's fourth amendment ar-
gument, see supra notes 33-61 and accompanying text.
112. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3209 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For the pertinent text of the
fourth amendment, see supra note 20. Note that the fourth amendment applies to unreasona-
ble searches and seizures. Justice Stevens argued that the Chief Justice did not analyze
whether the seizure clause of the fourth amendment provided a remedy to Palmer for the loss
of his property. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3209-10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
113. 104 S. Ct. 1652 (1984) (destruction of property in a field test for cocaine held to be an
unconstitutional interference with possessory interests).
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tinguish the two interests:
The first clause of the Fourth Amendment provides that
the "right of the people to be secure in their persons.., against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated...."
This text protects two types of expectations, one involving
"searches," the other "seizures." A "search" occurs when an
expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider rea-
sonable is infringed. A "seizure" of property occurs when
there is some meaningful interference with an individual's pos-
sessory interests in that property." 4
Justice Stevens next argued that Palmer's complaint adequately al-
leged a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment: "Palmer
was completely deprived of his possessory interests in his property; by
taking and destroying it, Hudson was asserting 'dominion and control'
over it; hence his conduct 'did constitute a seizure ....' "11s The fact
that Palmer's property was destroyed subsequent to the search did not
alter Justice Stevens' analysis. He argued that an individual was equally
deprived of his possessory interest when his property was destroyed as
when it was taken.'16 This differed from the approach taken by Justice
O'Connor, who argued that "incarceration abates all legitimate Fourth
Amendment privacy and possessory interests in personal effects."1 7 The
distinction between the two approaches was illustrated by Justice
Stevens:
The net result of her position, however, is that harassment by
means of temporarily-i.e., for no longer than the duration of
the prisoner's incarceration-depriving an inmate of his per-
sonal effects raises no Fourth Amendment issue, and no consti-
tutional issue of any kind if the property is ultimately
returned. 118
Justice Stevens rejected the Court's contention that the need for
prison security abated an inmate's possessory interests." 9 He contended
114. Id. at 1656, cited in Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3209 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3209 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. at
1660; and Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 574-75 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (holding
discussed supra note 33).
116. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3209 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 3206 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
118. Id. at 3209 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 3210 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The existence of Virginia remedies, according to
Justice Stevens, was irrelevant to the fourth amendment question, because 42 U.S.C. § 1983
provided a remedy for fourth amendment violations supplemental to any Virginia remedy that
may have existed. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3210 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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that Palmer's possession of the material was legitimate as a matter of
state law, because the material seized passed prison inspection regula-
tions.12 Not only did Palmer have a legal right under state law to pos-
sess the property, according to Justice Stevens, but the due process clause
as interpreted by Chief Justice Burger indicated that Palmer had a legiti-
mate right to the property."2 ' In responding to Palmer's contention that
the destruction of his property violated the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause, the Court found that the material seized was "prop-
erty." '122 According to Justice Stevens, "an interest cannot qualify as
'property' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause unless it
amounts to a legitimate claim of entitlement. Thus... the Court neces-
sarily indicates that Palmer had a legitimate claim of entitlement to the
material at issue."12 3 Once a state creates such an interest, Justice Ste-
vens noted that it is forbidden by the Constitution1 24 for the state to re-
voke the interest arbitrarily.125 "Thus Palmer had a legitimate right
under both state law and the Due Process Clause to possess the material
at issue." '126
Palmer's possessory interest, according to Justice Stevens, was also
protected by the eighth amendment's proscription against "cruel and un-
usual punishments."' 27 Justice Stevens reasoned that the eighth amend-
ment's proscriptions are measured by society's standard of decency.'28
120. Id. at 3210 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
121. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3203-04).
123. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
124. Justice Stevens did not indicate where the Constitution forbids a state to arbitrarily
revoke such an interest.
125. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 469-72 (1983) (due
process required to support prison official's decision to confine inmate to administrative segre-
gation); Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1979) (due process required
to deny parole release to inmates); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1973) (due process
required before prison administration may revoke inmate's goodtime credits)).
126. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court's own analysis indicated that Palmer had a
legitimate fourth amendment possessory interest in the property. Id. at 3212-13 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
127. Id. at 3211 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The eighth amendment provides that "[e]xcessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted." U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII. Justice Stevens claimed that the eighth amendment
protected Palmer's possessory interests, "as a matter of substantive constitutional law, entirely
apart from the legitimacy of those interests under state law or the Due Process Clause." Hud-
son, 104 S. Ct. at 3211 (Stevens J., dissenting).
128. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3211 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 352 (1981) (double celling of inmates is not cruel and unusual punishment within the
context of the eighth amendment); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976) (deliberate
indifference to an inmate's serious medical needs constituted a violation of the eighth amend-
ment)). By relying on society's standard of decency, Justice Stevens used an adpopulem test to
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The Chief Justice's finding that Palmer's possession of legal materials
and letters was not entitled to constitutional protection would not, in
Justice Stevens' judgment, "comport with any civilized standard of
decency." 129
Justice Stevens also argued that the first amendment entitled Palmer
to receive mail subject to the prison's right to censor it.130 He also rea-
soned that the fourteenth amendment's right to access the courts entitles
an inmate to reasonable access to legal materials.' 3 1 With constitutional
justification for concluding that Palmer had a legal possessory right in
the seized property, Justice Stevens concluded that "[i]t is therefore be-
yond me how the Court can question the legitimacy of Palmer's posses-
sory interests which were so clearly infringed by Hudson's alleged
conduct."'
132
After concluding Palmer adequately alleged a seizure, Justice Ste-
vens next considered whether the seizure was unreasonable in the context
of the fourth amendment. 133 Justice Stevens argued that inmates re-
tained those constitutional rights consistent with penological objectives,
such as punishment and rehabilitation.13 1 Under this standard, Hud-
son's seizure of Palmer's property was without penological justification.
Justice Stevens stressed that there was no evidentiary showing that
Palmer's property posed a threat to institutional security. He argued
that "[w]hen, as here, the material at issue is not contraband it simply
makes no sense to say that its seizure and destruction serves 'legitimate
institutional interests. ... .' Such seizures are unreasonable."' 1
35
determine the extent of eighth amendment protections. For a discussion of the fallacy of ad
populem, see infra note 182 and accompanying text.
129. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3211 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The first amendment provides that "congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. See
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (prison mail censorship deemed unconstitutional
under first and fourteenth amendments).
131. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3211 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Bounds v. Smith, 430
U.S. 817 (1977) (constitutional right of access to courts held to require prison authorities to
assist inmates in the preparation and filing of legal documents by providing inmates with ade-
quate law libraries or legal assistance).
132. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3211 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
133. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
134. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545-47 (1979)
(holding discussed supra note 33).
135. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3212 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The seizure was unreasonable,
according to Justice Stevens, since the property posed no threat to any penological goal:
there is no room for any conclusion but that the alleged seizure was unreasonable.
The need for "close and continual surveillance of inmates and their cells". .. in no
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Next, Justice Stevens addressed Chief Justice Burger's argument
that society would not recognize as reasonable any possessory interests of
prisoners. 136 This argument, according to Justice Stevens, was based on
the perception of the four justices who joined the opinion that Chief Jus-
tice Burger authored. 137 Justice Stevens also argued that, on the question
of what rights society was prepared to accept, the lower courts' consen-
sus that the fourth amendment did apply in prison cells was relevant. 138
The Court held that security needs of the prison determined
whether a search and seizure was reasonable. 139 Deference was given to
the view taken by prison administrators toward inmate conduct.1" Jus-
tice Stevens argued that Chief Justice Burger's contention that prison
officials need the power to search and seize was inaccurate. "To the con-
trary, it appears to be the near-universal view of correctional officials that
guards should neither seize nor destroy noncontraband property."
141
Virginia law similarly authorizes seizures of contraband material
alone. 142
way justifies taking and destroying noncontraband property; if material is examined
and found not to be contraband, there can be no justification for its seizure.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
137. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 3212 n.19 (Stevens, J., dissenting). A majority of the circuit courts have held
that the fourth amendment applies to prison cells. See, e.g., United States v. Mills, 704 F.2d
1553, 1560-61 (1 lth Cir. 1983) (to satisfy the fourth amendment, prison cell searches must be:
motivated by a legitimate penological objective; have no other less intrusive alternatives to the
search available; and conducted in a reasonable manner), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3517 (1984);
United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115, 128-29 (D.C. Cir. 1982),(inmates retain fourth
amendment protections consistent with institutional security); United States v. Chamorro, 687
F.2d 1, 4 (Ist Cir.) (inmates retain residuum of fourth amendment protection), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1043 (1982); United States v. Lilly, 576 F.2d 1240, 1244-46 (5th Cir. 1978) (govern-
ment has burden of proving reasonableness of prison cell search pursuant to fourth amend-
ment); Bonner v. Coughlin, 571 F.2d 1311, 1317 (7th Cir. 1975) (prisoners entitled to lesser
degree of fourth amendment protection than unincarcerated persons), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
932 (1978).
139. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3201.
140. Id. at 3200.
141. Id. at 3213 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUS-
TICE, FEDERAL STANDARDS FOR PRISONS AND JAILS § 13.01 (1980). Section 13.01 provides,
in pertinent part, "[w]ritten policy and procedure specify the personal property inmates can
retain in their possession.... It should be made clear to inmates what personal property they
may retain, and inmates should be assured both that the facility's policies are applied uni-
formly and that their property will be stored safely." Id., cited in Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3213
n.21 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
142. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3213-14 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing VA. CODE § 53.1-26
(1982)). Section 53.1-26 provides, in pertinent part, "[a]ny item of personal property which a
prisoner in any state correctional facility is prohibited from possessing by the Code of Virginia
or by the rules of the Director shall, when found in the possession of a prisoner, be confiscated
and sold or destroyed ...." Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3214 n.22 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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To justify the Court's security argument, Chief Justice Burger cited
the amount of violence in prisons.143 Justice Stevens argued that the use
of statistics to prove the reasonableness of a search and seizure was not
persuasive because the prison homicide rate was less than that in many
major cities.l" Also, the Chief Justice failed, in Justice Stevens' view, to
illustrate why society should treat all prisoners as violent and undeserv-
ing of a right of privacy. 45 Justice Stevens concluded that because ran-
dom searches of prison cells for contraband were reasonable, there was
no need for the seizure and destruction of noncontraband property found
during such searches. "To accord prisoners any less protection is to de-
clare that the prisoners are entitled to no measure of human dignity....
That is the view the Court takes today. It declares prisoners to be little
more than chattels, a view I thought society had outgrown long ago." '46
Justice Stevens argued that by allowing such seizures of an inmate's
property, the Court ignored the applicability of the fourth amendment to
prisons. The courts have a special obligation to inmates, according to
Justice Stevens, because prisoners are "[d]isenfranchised, scorned and
feared... [and] shut away from public view...." 147 Under this theory,
because Palmer's property was seized, the Court had a duty to determine
whether the seizure was justified. By adopting a "bright-line rule" that
all searches and seizures in prisons are reasonable because of security
needs, according to Justice Stevens, the Court has sacrificed "constitu-
tional principle to the Court's own assessment of administrative
expediency." 4 '
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure Violation
The language of the fourth amendment expressly protects individu-
als from unreasonable searches and seizures. Prior to 1967, courts
143. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3200. For discussion of the magnitude of violence in prisons, see
supra note 45 and accompanying text.
144. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3214 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens cited Dallas,
Miami, New York and Washington, D.C. as examples of cities with greater homicide rates
than the annual prison homicide rates. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 3215 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens further stated that the view that all
prisoners are violent and incorrigible is inconsistent "with an enlightened view of the function
of a modem prison system." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
146. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 3216 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated that the courts were the last
arena of protection for inmates who have nowhere else to look for whatever minimal rights the
constitution grants them. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 3217 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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viewed the fourth amendment as protecting only private property, homes
and the area immediately surrounding the dwelling from unreasonable
searches.1 4 9 In 1967, the Court rejected this traditional, limited protec-
tion of the fourth amendment in Katz v. United States."' In Katz, Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents placed electronic
eavesdropping equipment on a public telephone booth that Katz, a book-
maker, used to conduct illegal. transactions. In finding that the fourth
amendment was intended to protect people, not places, the Court stated
that:
[t]his effort to decide whether or not a given "area," viewed in
the abstract, is "constitutionally protected" deflects attention
from the problem presented by this case. For the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places. What a person know-
ingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection .... But what
he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected.151
Justice Harlan, concurring in Katz, outlined a two-prong test to de-
termine whether a person was entitled to fourth amendment protection
against unreasonable searches: "[fJirst that a person have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expecta-
tion be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "152
The Court in the past has found that the fourth amendment is not
limited to unreasonable searches. "The Fourth Amendment proscribes,
to be sure, unreasonable 'seizures' as well as 'searches.' "153 Thus, analy-
sis of Hudson's actions vis-a-vis Palmer requires an examination of the
149. See United States v. Potts, 297 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1961) (fourth amendment protects
homes and the area surrounding the dwelling).
150. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
151. Id. at 351-52. The Court has occasionally described the fourth amendment as creating
constitutionally protected "areas." See, eg., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 51 (fourth
amendment's protections include conversation and use of electronic devices to capture conver-
sation). However, Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz suggested that this concept cannot
serve as a solution to every fourth amendment problem. Katz, 389 U.S. at 362.
152. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
153. Chambers v. Maroney, 399.U.S. 42, 63 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
In Chambers, the Court sanctioned the search of defendant's car. The Court found that the
impoundment of the car at a police station was reasonable pursuant to the fourth amendment
even though there were no exigent circumstances giving the police officers probable cause to
believe that any evidence in the car would become unavailable. Id. at 51-52. Justice Harlan,
dissenting in part, argued that the Court erred in lumping together the search and seizure,
since the degree of intrusion upon defendant's privacy is greater when a search is followed by a
seizure of the car. Id. at 63-64: (Harlan, J., dissenting in part).
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reasonableness of the search of his cell and seizure of his property in the
context of the fourth amendment.
While the Court has liberally extended some constitutional rights to
inmates,"5 4 it has been less forthcoming where the fourth amendment
was concerned. Prior to Hudson v. Palmer, the majority of the twelve
courts of appeals had held that inmates retain a minimal degree of fourth
amendment protection. 55 Although the Katz Court found that the
fourth amendment protected "people, not places," the Hudson Court was
unwilling to extend the same degree of protection to prisoners.
Indeed, with the decision in Hudson, the Court has created an ex-
ception to the Katz rule: where prison cells are concerned the fourth
amendment analysis focuses on the place rather than the person. Under
the Hudson rationale, the fourth amendment was ineffective to protect
the rights of inmates in a federal correctional institution. Chief Justice
Burger found that the institution's security needs outweighed the in-
mate's need to be free from unreasonable searches.156 The Chief Justice's
security test was crucial to the outcome of the case, because if Palmer did
not threaten prison security, he should have retained a fourth amend-
ment privacy right.157 For example, in United States v. Hinckley,
1t 8
prison guards seized a private note possessed by Hinckley. Hinckley had
been subject to massive security protection due to the nature of his al-
leged crime, an assassination attempt against the President of the United
States. In finding the search of Hinckley's cell violative of the fourth
amendment, the court held that "the right to freedom from arbitrary
interference with privacy, must and can be recognized even in a detention
context." 159
Thus, the key issue in Hudson was whether the need for prison se-
154. See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 138. However, the Second and Ninth Circuits have found that the
fourth amendment does not apply to inmates in all cases. See Christman v. Skinner, 468 F.2d
723 (2d Cir. 1972) (monitoring inmate's conversations violated no fourth amendment right);
United States v. Hitchcock, 467 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1972) (prison cell shares none of the
attributes of home, automobile, office or hotel room; thus, warrantless search of cell reason-
able), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 916 (1973).
156. Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3201 (1984).
157. Chief Justice Burger maintained that searches conducted in the name of institutional
security are legitimate. Id. Because Hudson's search was carried out not to improve security
but rather to harass Palmer, Chief Justice Burger's conclusion that Hudson's search of
Palmer's prisoner cell was not violative of the fourth amendment was incorrect.
158. 672 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
159. Id. at 129. The First Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Chamorro, holding that
inmates were protected by the fourth amendment from unreasonable searches and seizures.
United States v. Chamorro, 687 F.2d 1, 4 (Ist Cir. 1982). But cf. Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S.
139 (1962) (prisoners not entitled to the same privacy rights as non-inmates).
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curity outweighed Palmer's right to be free from unreasonable searches.
In balancing these goals, Chief Justice Burger entrusted the determina-
tion of the nature of the security threat solely to prison administrators.16
By so doing, however, he failed to deal with the problem of an overzeal-
ous guard. In a dispute over the need for a search, prison officials are
more likely to believe the statement of a guard that the search was justi-
fied. 161 The effect of the Chief Justice's finding is to allow prison guards,
who are not likely to be knowledgable in fourth amendment law, to con-
trol the amount of privacy given to inmates. This discretion places the
"liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer." '162 To remedy
this situation, the Hudson Court should have relied on the Hinckley
court's reasoning that the prison administrator's "discretion should and
must be corralled by the fourth amendment's prohibition of arbitrary in-
vasions of privacy."163
In Hudson, the Court upheld a search that was not necessary for
institutional security, but was conducted solely to harass Palmer. 1" Jus-
tice Stevens argued that since Palmer presented no security threat,16 the
decision against Palmer was a misapplication of the Court's security
threat test. Justice Stevens correctly stated that rather than presenting a
security threat, Palmer was the victim of a search conducted only to har-
ass. 166 Since there was no security threat, the Supreme Court should
have reached the same conclusion as the court in Hinckley-the absence
of a security threat is an exception to the general rule that prisoners have
160. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3200. See also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979). In Bell,
the respondent inmates challenged confinement conditions at a New York City jail, alleging
violations of the first, fourth and fifth amendments. In finding against respondents, Justice
Rehnquist reasoned that:
the problems that arise in the day-to-day operation of a corrections facility are not
susceptible to easy solutions. Prison administrators therefore should be accorded
wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies ... that in their
judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain insti-
tutional security.
Id.
161. Guards are also well situated individually or in collusion to destroy and/or cover-up
evidence relating to the validity of a search.
162. Hinckley, 672 F.2d at 129 (citing United States v. Lilly, 576 F.2d 1240, 1244 (5th Cir.
1978) (fourth amendment adopted in reaction to issuance of general warrants that gave gov-
ernment officials broad discretion to conduct searches) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 625 (1886) (statute requiring defendants and claimants to produce their private
books held unconstitutional violation of fourth and fifth amendments))).
163. Hinckley, 672 F.2d at 129.
164. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3197, 3205.
165. Id. at 3212 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 3210 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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no privacy right. Indeed, Chief Justice Burger established a security
threat test in Hudson:
[t]he two interests here are the interest of society in the security
of its penal institutions and the interest of the prisoner in pri-
vacy within his cell. The latter interest, of course, is already
limited by the exigencies of the circumstances.... We strike
the balance in favor of institutional security ....
Instead of analyzing the nature of Palmer's threat to institutional secur-
ity, the Chief Justice skirted the issue by arguing that since inmates enjoy
no privacy right, he need not address the merits of Palmer's conten-
tion. 68 Thus, in Hudson, the Chief Justice concluded that the two goals
necessarily conflict.
16 9
Contrary to the Chief Justice's conclusion, institutional security and
an inmate's right to be free from unreasonable searches conflict only
when one goal threatens the existence of the other goal.170 The Hinckley
court found that:
[t]here is, therefore, no inherent conflict between the fourth
amendment's requirements and the realities of institutional
confinement....
Proceeding on that premise, the district court held that
"the residuum of Fourth Amendment protection afforded
Hinckley as a pretrial detainee exceeded that recognized by the
Butner officers in their search of his cell."'
171
In Hinckley, the twin goals were found not to be mutually exclusive.
In fact, that court found the search to be so egregious that it violated
Hinckley's fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches.172 The court concluded that:
[b]ecause the guards were not acting in accord with an estab-
lished institutional practice or policy that such reading was
necessary to maintain institutional or inmate security, there
167. Id. at 3200-01. See supra notes 33-55 and accompanying text.
168. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3202. Chief Justice Burger reasoned that "[b]ecause we con-
clude that prisoners have no legitimate expectation of privacy and that the Fourth Amend-
ment's prohibition on unreasonable searches does not apply in prison cells, we need not
address [Palmer's legitimate expectation of privacy]." Id.
169. Id. at 3201.
170. If the right to be free from unreasonable searches does not violate prison security, the
Katz guarantee that the fourth amendment protects people and not places should have pro-
tected Palmer.
171. Hinckley, 672 F.2d at 129-30 (quoting United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp, 1342,
1360 (D.D.C. 1981)).
172. Id. at 130-31.
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was no reasoned, principled decision by the prison administra-
tion entitled to deference. Instead, a serious invasion of Hinck-
ley's right to privacy in his own papers was perpetrated by
individual officers unguided by prison rules or even the instruc-
tions of their superiors. 73
Since Palmer similarly presented no security threat, Chief Justice Burger
should have followed the Hinckley court's conclusion regarding the vio-
lation of Palmer's fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches. Thus, by assuming the mutual exclusivity of the competing
goals of institutional security and Palmer's right to be free from unrea-
sonable searches, the Court unnecessarily sanctioned an invasion of
Palmer's fourth amendment right because the search for noncontraband
items did not protect institutional security.174
Palmer had a legitimate expectation of privacy because he was not a
threat to institutional security. The Supreme Court in Katz clearly in-
tended to reject the notion that the fourth amendment protects places
instead of people.' 75 As long as Palmer identified a subjective expectation
of privacy, he met the first prong of Justice Harlan's privacy test estab-
lished in Katz.'76
Chief Justice Burger addressed the second prong of Justice Harlan's
privacy test by arguing that society was not prepared to accept a privacy
right for inmates.177 The Chief Justice's argument ignored the fallacy of
ad populem. Succinctly stated, popular opinion is not the correct source
of constitutional law. Rather, the constitution was designed to protect
the interests of minority viewpoints and rights against the "tyranny of
the majority." Accordingly, Harry Wellington, a constitutional law
scholar, has stated that "[t]he Court's task is to ascertain the weight of
the principle in conventional morality and to convert the moral principle
into a legal one by connecting it with the body of constitutional law."' 78
Thus, the function of the Court is to merge constitutional law and the
entirety of public opinion into the rules of law that society lives by.
173. Id.
174. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3202; id. at 3206 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Chief Justice Bur-
ger assumed Palmer did not threaten institutional security, id. at 3197, while Justice O'Connor
did not comment on that issue. Thus, using the analysis of the Hinckley court, there was no
need to restrict Palmer's fourth amendment right to be free from the unreasonable search;
these two goals were compatible.
175. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
177. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3201.
178. H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes
on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 284 (1973).
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In Hudson, the Chief Justice created fourth amendment law based
on his perceptions of society's belief about prisoner's rights, despite the
fact that the Court "certainly has no machinery with which to take a
Gallup Poll."' 7 9 Simply because society fails to believe prisoners have a
fourth amendment privacy right does not mean that inmates are not con-
stitutionally entitled to such a right. By creating law based on their own
perception of what society considered to be the rights of prisoners, the
plurality violated the due process rights of prisoners as a class. In
Breithaupt v. Abram,' the Court found that "due process is not mea-
sured by the yardstick of personal reaction.., but by that whole commu-
nity sense of 'decency and fairness' that has been woven by common
experience into the fabric of acceptable conduct. It is on this bedrock
that this Court has established the concept of due process."1'81
By not providing proof that society would deny a right of privacy to
inmates, especially to those who do not threaten prison security, the
Chief Justice created the illusion of consensus. His reasoning illustrates
the inherent danger of adopting an ad populem standard-the views of
the minority can be suppressed by those of the majority. Constitutional
law scholar John Hart Ely commented that "by viewing society's values
through one's own spectacles-resolving apparent inconsistencies in pop-
ular thinking in the 'appropriate' direction by favoring the [views of the
majority] .. .one can convince oneself that some invocable consensus
supports almost any position a civilized person might want to see sup-
ported."' 2 Ely provided insight into Chief Justice Burger's reasoning
process. The Chief Justice created a societal consensus where none may
have existed. In creating that consensus, the Court limited fourth
amendment protection to prisoners, an example of Ely's contention that
the views of the majority may, where no real consensus exists, limit con-
stitutional rights entitled to the minority. Thus, while Palmer's claim
may not have met the second prong of Justice Harlan's Katz test for a
right of privacy, in light of the inherent undesirability of an ad populem
standard, the Court should have reconsidered Justice Harlan's require-
ment that society must be prepared to accept an inmate's right to
privacy.
The Chief Justice offered proof for his argument that violent crime
179. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 519 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (Connecticut
statute forbidding the use of contraceptives violated right of marital privacy contained within
the penumbra of the Bill of Rights).
180. 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
181. Id. at 436.
182. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 67 (1980).
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occurs in prison. 183 He concluded that the prison crime rate was a reason
that inmates could not be trusted with a legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy. 184 However, Chief Justice Burger failed to justify why an "inno-
cent" prisoner, one who is not guilty of an additional crime after entering
prison, should pay for his fellow inmate's violent acts with the loss of his
own privacy right. His failure to individualize Palmer's loss of privacy
violated the Court's holding in Ybarra v. Illinois.185 In Ybarra, the Court
refused to sanction the search of a patron of a bar which was legitimately
targeted for search by a warrant. 186 The Court reasoned that the search
of a person incidentally on the premises was beyond the scope of the
warrant.187 The failure of the warrant to specify Ybarra, a patron of the
bar, made the search illegal.' 8 8 In Hudson, the Court strayed from its
holding in Ybarra. The Hudson Court sanctioned a search relying on
Palmer's incidental presence in prison. As the sole justification for the
search, Palmer's presence in prison did not justify his loss of the right to
be free from unreasonable searches.
Additionally, refusing to grant Palmer a right of privacy due to the
actions of other prisoners may have been an imposition of cruel and unu-
sual punishment against Palmer.'89 In Coker v. Georgia,190 Justice
White, writing for the Court, found that the execution sentence of a con-
victed rapist was excessive and violated the eighth amendment restriction
against cruel and unusual punishment.191 He reasoned that the sentence
made no contribution to accepted theories of punishment and was noth-
ing more than the needless imposition of pain and suffering. 192
Denying Palmer's right to be free from unreasonable searches did
not further any rational theory of punishment. Rather, by allowing Hud-
son to seize Palmer's noncontraband personal property, Chief Justice
Burger ignored the rule of Coker and condoned the needless imposition
183. For the magnitude of violent crime in prisons cited by the Chief Justice, see supra note
45 and accompanying text.
184. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3200. Chief Justice Burger may have thought that a right of
privacy and of freedom from unreasonable "shakedown" searches contributed to the prison
crime rate by allowing inmates the opportunity to conceal weapons in their cells from prison
authorities.
185. 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
186. Id. at 96.
187. Id. at 92-93.
188. Id. at 96.
189. For text of the eighth amendment, see supra note 127.
190. 433 U.S. 584 (1977). In Coker, the defendant, an escapee from a Georgia prison, raped
a woman in the course of committing an armed robbery. Id. at 587. He was convicted and
sentenced to death on the rape charge. Id. at 591.
191. Id. at 592. For text of the eighth amendment, see supra note 112.
192. Coker, 433 U.S. at 599.
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of pain and suffering on Palmer in violation of the eighth amendment., 93
By analogy, Justice Stevens faulted Chief Justice Burger's reliance
on the prison crime rate to deny inmates a right of privacy. Justice Ste-
vens argued that citizens of Miami, New York and Dallas, all cities with
higher crime rates than the prison crime rate cited by the Chief Justice,
have a legitimate expectation of privacy. 194 Accordingly, Justice Stevens
concluded that the prison crime rate was insufficient to deny inmates
fourth amendment protections against unreasonable searches. 195 His
analogy, however, failed to refute Chief Justice Burger's reasoning. In-
mates are closely monitored and they live in conditions that many times
contain explosive combinations of overcrowding and unsanitary condi-
tions. While similar conditions may exist in some cities, they do not rival
the persistently overcrowded and unsanitary conditions of many prisons
in the United States. 196 In this respect, Justice Stevens' analogy fails to
illustrate why an inmate has a legitimate expectation of privacy similar to
that granted ordinary citizens in any of the four cities he cited.
Seen in the light of recent Supreme Court cases, 197 Hudson is an
example of the Court's limitation on the fourth amendment's prohibition
193. The Court found that "a punishment is 'excessive' and unconstitutional if it... makes
no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than
the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering.... ." Id. at 592. Further "pun-
ishing" Palmer by not allowing him to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures makes no
measurable contribution to the goals of punishment which were satisfied when Palmer was
sentenced.
194. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3214 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
195. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
196. Correctional facilities have been neglected:
[t]he most tangible evidence of this neglect is in the nation's prisons, which can be
characterized as physically inadequate, unsafe institutions. Overcrowded living con-
ditions and inadequate health care are two frequently cited areas of deficiency that
indicate states have not fulfilled their custodial obligations. An equally salient custo-
dial failure is the inability of correctional administrations to protect inmates from the
predatory violence of other prisoners. Today's prisons are bleak and dangerous
places.
S. ZIMMERMAN & H. MILLER, CORRECTIONS AT THE CROSSROADS: DESIGNING POLICY 9
(1981).
197. The Court's decision in Hudson is an example of the Court's determined effort to cut
back on the scope of fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches. The semi-
nal case dealing with the right to be free from unreasonable searches, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961), applied the fourth amendment's search clause to the states. In Mapp, police of-
ficers arrived at Mrs. Mapp's residence in Cleveland pursuant to information that an individ-
ual wanted for questioning in connection with a bombing was hiding in the home. Mrs. Mapp
refused to admit the officers without a warrant. Id. at 644. Subsequently, officers returned to
her residence and gained admittance by forcing open the door. When Mrs. Mapp again de-
manded to see a warrant, one of the officers showed her a piece of paper purported to be the
warrant. Mrs. Mapp grabbed the paper and placed it in her bosom. She was arrested for
resisting the officers' rescue of the paper from her person. During the search of her home,
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of unreasonable searches. In denying inmates any right of privacy, the
various obscene materials were discovered, resulting in her conviction. No search warrant was
produced at Mrs. Mapp's trial. Id. at 644-45.
The Court reversed Mrs. Mapp's conviction. Id. at 656. The Court stated that "[o]nly
last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule 'is to deter-to
compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by remov-
ing the incentive to disregard it."' Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656 (citing Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (evidence illegally seized by state officers inadmissible in federal criminal
trial)). The Mapp Court, again citing Elkins, also concluded that:
there is another consideration-the imperative of judicial integrity .... The criminal
goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a
government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disre-
gard of the charter of its own existence.
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659 (citing Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222). Additionally, Mapp provided that
evidence seized during illegal searches should be excluded for reasons of deterrence and judi-
cial integrity. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656, 659.
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), expanded the exclusionary rule, allowing
evidence seized as an indirect result of an illegal search to be excluded. In Wong Sun, federal
narcotics agents illegally broke into Toy's apartment and handcuffed him. Immediately after
the entry, Toy made a statement implicating Yee as the individual who sold him the heroin in
question. The agents went immediately to Yee, who surrendered heroin to them, and who
then made a statement implicating Toy and Wong Sun as the individuals who sold him the
heroin. Wong Sun was subsequently arrested without probable cause. Both Wong Sun and
Toy were arraigned and released on their own recognizance. A few days later, Wong Sun gave
a voluntary confession. Id. at 472-76, 491. The Court held that Toy's statement could not be
used against him because it was a "fruit" of the illegal invasion of his privacy. Id. at 485-86.
Also inadmissible against Toy was the heroin seized from Yee. Id. at 488. The Court ruled
that the seizure of the heroin was a direct result of Toy's statement, itself an inadmissible fruit
of the illegal invasion. Id. at 487-88. The drugs, however, were admissible against Wong Sun
since "[tihe seizure of this heroin invaded no right of privacy of person or premises which
would entitle Wong Sun to object to its use at his trial." Id. at 492. Additionally, even though
the Court conceded that his arrest was illegal, Wong Sun's own confession was ruled admissi-
ble against him since Wong Sun had confessed voluntarily a few days after the arrest. Thus,
"the connection between the arrest and the statement had 'become so attenuated as to dissipate
the taint.'" Id. at 491 (citing Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939) (evidence
obtained by illegal wiretapping inadmissible)).
The broad interpretation of the search clause reached a zenith in Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), where the Court excluded incriminating evidence in a murder case
since warrantless searches are per se invalid, and this case did not fit into a judicially recog-
nized exception. Id. at 453-82.
Since Coolidge, the Court has narrowed its interpretation of the scope of the fourth
amendment's search clause. For example, in United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), the
Court held that a "canine sniff" by a trained drug detecting dog of the defendant's luggage did
not amount to a "search" within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Id. at 707. The sniff
technique, reasoned the Court, was "much less intrusive than a typical search," and does not
tell the officials anything about noncontraband items in the luggage. Id.
The Court again refused to find a "search" in United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652
(1984). In Jacobsen, federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) officers intercepted
plastic bags containing a white powdery substance. Before permitting the delivery of the bags
to Jacobsen, the DEA agents conducted field tests on the powder to determine whether the
substance was cocaine. Prior to the DEA officials' search, the box containing the substance
was opened by Federal Express agents who then proceeded to examine the contents of the box.
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Court has expressly created an exception to the Katz principle that the
fourth amendment should protect individuals, not places.198 Addition-
ally, the Court's use of an ad populem test leaves in doubt the protections
of the fourth amendment for the next group "society" deems not worthy
of the right to be free from unreasonable searches.199 The Hudson
Court's decision likely will have two results: (1) the elimination of any
right of privacy allowed inmates and (2) the establishment of an ad
populem test that can be used in subsequent cases by the Court to deny
fourth amendment privacy rights to a particular class.
To protect institutional security, the Court need not have taken the
extreme step of eliminating an inmate's right to privacy. For example,
the Hudson Court could have found the search unreasonable because it
was conducted solely to harass and humiliate Palmer. Such a finding
would not have decreased prison security, since the Court could have still
found that searches conducted to find contraband or for any other valid
purpose, such as evidence of conspiracy or escape plans, would not be
unreasonable. Under such a rationale, Palmer's fourth amendment right
to be free from unreasonable searches would have been preserved.
Justice Stevens' dissent also provided insight into a solution which
The test involved opening the bags and placing the powder in tubes; if the liquid inside the
tubes turned a certain color, the substance was cocaine. The Court found this not to be a
"search" since Jacobsen had "no legitimate privacy interest." Id. at 1662. Additionally, Ja-
cobsen had no legitimate expectation of privacy because Federal Express employees had al-
ready examined the contents of the box. Id. at 1660-61.
Finally, in United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984), the Court found that a police
search did not violate the fourth amendment since the officers conducted the search in a good-
faith belief that the search was constitutional. In Leon, the police, relying on a facially valid
search warrant, illegally searched several premises. Id. at 3409-I1. Admitting that the war-
rant did not contain sufficient probable cause, the Supreme Court found that the search did not
violate the fourth amendment's search clause since the police officers searched the premises in
"good faith," believing the warrant to be adequate. Id. at 3423. Thus, the fourth amendment
privacy right upheld in Mapp, Wong Sun and Coolidge has been narrowed considerably in
recent years.
198. Hudson represents the Court's finding that the fourth amendment applies to persons
only in the context of their location. Thus, instead of the privacy right being independent of
the place searched as in Katz, where prisoners are concerned the privacy right is now a func-
tion of where the search occurs.
199. Chief Justice Burger relied on what he considered to be the views of the majority of
society. In Hudson, the fourth amendment claim of Palmer, a member of a minority class (i.e.,
prison inmates), was in effect defeated by the wishes of the majority, acting through the per-
ceptions of Chief Justice Burger. Carried to the extreme, this would seem to have established a
dangerous trend: whenever the majority chooses to supersede the rights of a minority class, it
would be able to do so. There is an irony in the Court's becoming the tool of the majority of
society. The Supreme Court is the final arbitrator of constitutional issues. Yet, the Constitu-
tion and the Bill of Rights were designed to protect the interests of all citizens of the United
States. The Court, in adopting an ad populem decision-making model, stands in a position to
do great damage to minority interests.
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would preserve both institutional security and an inmate's privacy right.
If Hudson's seizure was found to be unreasonable, "shakedown"
searches would still be authorized in the name of institutional security.
However, the fourth amendment's restriction against unreasonable
seizures would provide Palmer with a meaningful remedy under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. 200
These alternative solutions indicate that the Court need not have
denied Palmer his fourth amendment right of privacy in order to better
guarantee prison security. The twin goals of institutional security and
inmate privacy pursuant to Katz are not mutually exclusive.
B. Deprivation of Palmer's property without due process
1. Fourteenth amendment
The fourteenth amendment protects an individual from deprivations
of property without due process of law.2°1 What constitutes an unconsti-
tutional deprivation has been the subject of much debate in the courts.
Prior to Hudson v. Palmer, courts had generally found that the negligent
deprivation of an inmate's property, where no pre-deprivation hearing
occurred, did not violate the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause.2o2
In Parratt v. Taylor,2 "3 the Court held that the fourteenth amend-
ment's due process guarantee did not require the state to hold a pre-
deprivation hearing where meaningful state remedies would suffice for
any subsequent claim brought by the inmate.2" In Parratt, a Nebraska
200. For text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see supra text accompanying note 19.
201. For the pertinent text of the fourteenth amendment, see supra note 21. Courts have
held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 applies to takings of property in violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment's due process clause. See, eg., Hofferber v. First Nat'l Bank, 437 F. Supp. 788 (W.D.
Okla. 1977) (court found it beyond doubt that property rights were protected by the fourteenth
amendment and violations thereof could be redressed pursuant to § 1983); Suarez v. Adminis-
trador Del Deporte Hipico de Puerto Rico, 354 F. Supp. 320 (D.P.R. 1972) (no distinction
between property rights and other human rights in actions pursuant to § 1983).
202. See Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975) (negligence of prison guards in
facilitating the taking of inmate's trial transcript by third person did not constitute state depri-
vation of property without due process of law pursuant to § 1983), cert denied, 435 U.S. 932
(1978).
203. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
204. Id. at 543-44. See also Juncker v. Tinney, 549 F. Supp. 574 (D. Md. 1982) (plaintiff
alleging deprivation of liberty interest without due process not permitted to bring § 1983 ac-
tion in federal court since plaintiff had adequate post-deprivation remedy in state court). In
some cases, where the state provides an adequate post-deprivation hearing, in order to obtain
dismissal of a due process claim of intentional deprivation of property the defendant has the
burden of establishing that the pre-deprivation hearing is impractical. See e.g., Keniston v.
Roberts, 717 F.2d 1295, 1301-02 (9th Cir. 1983) (claim that electric company cut off electric
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prison inmate ordered a hobby kit by mail, which was negligently lost
after its receipt by prison authorities. The inmate brought an action pur-
suant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to recover the value of the hobby kit.2"' Rea-
soning that pre-deprivation procedures were impractical to prevent the
negligent act of a prison official, the Court rejected the prisoner's claim,
because it found that Nebraska provided a meaningful remedy to the in-
mate.2" 6 Thus, where the deprivation of an inmate's property is due to
the negligence of the prison staff, courts are unlikely to allow a successful
action against a state pursuant to section 1983.207
The Court again dealt with the negligent deprivation of an individ-
ual's property in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.20 In Logan, an Illi-
nois statute protected handicapped employees from discrimination which
was unrelated to work ability. Logan brought his allegedly wrongful
termination to the attention of the requisite Illinois commission within
the statutorily required time, but the commission failed to take timely
action.2" Logan's former employer defended by arguing that Logan was
claiming the same type of negligent deprivation of property as that com-
plained of in Parratt, and that consequently the case should be remitted
to the tort remedies prescribed by the Illinois Court of Claims Act.210
The Court disagreed, and created an exception to the Parratt rule that
negligent deprivations are not per se violative of due process. The Court
found that since Logan was challenging an "established state procedure"
that destroyed his entitlement, due process required that a hearing be
held in order to give Logan the "proper procedural safeguards" required
by the fourteenth amendment.2 "
Not only was section 1983 found to protect individuals from "estab-
power to plaintiff's home without notice or hearing did not violate due process). In Bynum v.
Kidd, 570 F. Supp. 696 (W.D.N.C. 1983), the district court dismissed an inmate's action seek-
ing compensation for the loss of his personal property during his confinement in a county jail,
because North Carolina provided a sufficient statutory remedy by which the inmate would
receive redress for his loss. Id.
205. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 529. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary
judgment for the prisoner.
206. Id. at 543. The Court reasoned that because the act of deprivation occurred as the
result of a random act of a state official, it was impossible to predict when such acts would
occur. Id. Thus, the Court concluded that in most cases it would be impossible to provide a
meaningful hearing before the deprivation. Id. Because the Parratt Court found that Ne-
braska provided the prisoner with a meaningful tort remedy for his alleged property depriva-
tion, the due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment were satisfied. Id. at 543.
207. See supra notes 202-04.
208. 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
209. Id. at 424, 426.
210. Id. at 436.
211. Id. at 436-37.
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lished state procedures" violative of due process, it was also found to
protect individuals from intentional deprivations violative of due process.
The Fifth Circuit held in McCoy v. Gordon212 that while a claim of negli-
gent deprivation of property was not sufficient to state a cause of action
pursuant to section 1983 if meaningful state remedies existed, a charge
that a state official intentionally deprived an individual of property was
sufficient to state a claim under section 1983.213 Additionally, in Wolff v.
McDonnell,2"4 the Court found that in cases of impending state action
against an inmate, written notice of the impending action was required in
order "to give the charged party a chance to marshal the facts in his
defense and to clarify what the charges are, in fact."215 Thus, in contrast
to the unwillingness of courts to allow individuals a remedy pursuant to
section 1983 for negligent deprivations of property, prior to Hudson,
courts were willing to grant relief when the claim involved an "estab-
lished state procedure" or an intentional deprivation of property.216
Hudson seemingly contradicts the Court's holding in Wolffthat an
inmate is protected by minimal constitutional rights. Hudson's actions
were intentional; he intended to harass and humiliate Palmer by search-
ing, seizing and destroying his personal property.217 Yet, the Court re-
lied on Parratt to find that Hudson's actions did not violate Palmer's
fourteenth amendment due process right, even though Parratt was lim-
ited to negligent deprivations of an inmate's property. In Hudson,
Palmer's loss was due to the intentional acts of Hudson. Culpability is
more pronounced in Hudson due to the lack of necessity for the depriva-
tion of Palmer's property. The Court should have followed its decision
in Logan, where the Court disallowed an "established state procedure"
212. 709 F.2d 1060 (5th Cir. 1983).
213. Id. at 1062.
214. 418 U.S. 539 (1974). For a discussion of Wolff, see supra note 5.
215. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-64. In Wolff, the impending state action concerned the imposi-
tion of disciplinary procedures against inmates as authorized by the prison administration. Id.
It should be noted that the imposition of disciplinary procedures against prisoners is similar to
an inmate's loss of privacy since both actions are implemented by the state. Thus, Wolff
should not be distinguished from Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984), on that point. See
also Biagiarelli v. Sielaff, 483 F.2d 508 (3d Cir. 1973) (due process requires that prisoner be
given written notice of basis for removal from general prison population and opportunity to
rebut charges in a hearing); Worley v. Bounds, 355 F. Supp. 115 (W.D.N.C. 1973) (prisoner
sentenced to disciplinary segregation entitled to: (1) written copy of charges against him;
(2) confrontation with his accuser; (3) opportunity to explain his actions; and (4) written expla-
nation of the reason for decision of the hearing officers); Johnson v. Lark, 365 F. Supp. 289
(E.D. Mo. 1973) (practice of subjecting federal prisoners to disciplinary confinement in segre-
gation cells without opportunity for a hearing violated due process).
216. See supra note 215.
217. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3197.
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which violated Logan's property rights. In Hudson, the state sanctioned
a prison procedure which allowed Hudson to seize and destroy Palmer's
property without convening a timely hearing. The Court also ignored its
reasoning in Wolff that where state action is imminent, to deprive an
inmate of a right, due process requires that the prisoner have the oppor-
tunity to respond to the charges prior to the deprivation.218
The Hudson Court ignored another fact distinguishing Parratt from
Hudson-the failure of the inmate in Parratt to claim that Nebraska's
post-deprivation procedures were inadequate. 219 This was the basis of
the Parratt Court's finding that the negligent deprivation of the inmate's
property was not violative of his due process right; the Court assumed
Nebraska provided adequate post-deprivation remedies.220 In Hudson,
no such guarantee existed for Palmer. While Virginia had waived sover-
eign immunity for state officials in certain circumstances by enacting the
Virginia Tort Claims Act,221 Chief Justice Burger argued that this ave-
nue was not open to Palmer.22 2 Indeed, Virginia employees have been
held immune for their actions occurring under color of title. For exam-
ple, in Banks v. Sellers,223 the court held that a superintendent of schools
and a school principal were entitled to sovereign immunity from a negli-
gence charge.224 Again, in Lawhorne v. Harlan,225 the court held that
state employees exercising supervisory functions and discretionary judg-
ment within the scope of their employment at state hospitals were also
226immune.
Hudson is more analogous to cases such as Logan and Wolff where
the inmates were required to have the opportunity to rebut the damaging
charges prior to the deprivation, rather than Parratt, which was limited
218. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564.
219. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 543.
220. In Parratt, the Court stated:
[t]he Fourteenth Amendment protects only against deprivations "without due pro-
cess of law".... Our inquiry therefore must focus on whether the respondent has
suffered a deprivation of property without due process of law. In particular, we must
decide whether the tort remedies which the State of Nebraska provides as a means of
redress for property deprivations satisfy the requirements of procedural due process.
Id. at 537 (citation omitted). Since the prisoner made no claim to the contrary, the Court
found no violation of his due process rights. Id. at 543.
221. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.1-.8 (1984).
222. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3205 n.15.
223. 224 Va. 168, 294 S.E.2d 862 (1982).
224. Id. at 173, 294 S.E.2d at 865.
225. 214 Va. 405, 200 S.E.2d 569 (1973) rev'd sub nom on other grounds, First Va. Bank-
Colonial v. Baker, 225 Va. 72, 301 S.E.2d 8 (1983).
226. Id. at 407-08, 200 S.E.2d at 572.
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to negligent deprivations of property and where meaningful state reme-
dies were found to exist to guarantee the inmate's due process right.
In relying on Parratt, the Court has, in effect, sanctioned the de-
struction of an inmate's property without due process of law. In Calero-
Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,227 the Court stated in dictum that:
It therefore has been implied that it would be difficult to reject
the constitutional claim of an owner whose property subjected
to forfeiture had been taken from him without his privity or
consent .... Similarly, the same might be said of an owner who
proved . . . that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the
wrongful activity... for, in that circumstance, it would be diffi-
cult to conclude that forfeiture served legitimate purposes and
was not unduly oppressive.228
Palmer's retention of legal materials and letters was not wrongful.
Since there was no institutional security justification for the seizure and
forfeiture of Palmer's property, it is difficult to ascertain what legitimate
purposes were served by Hudson's actions. By taking away the remedy
of section 1983, the Court is forcing prisoners to look to existing state
law in order to remedy the deprivation. In effect, it is now up to the state
to provide the inmate due process. In states like Virginia, however, rem-
edies are uncertain at best. 229 Even if a state statute authorizes a remedy,
the inmate faces the obstacle of trying to persuade a civil court of his
claim against the testimony of the prison administration.
Chief Justice Burger relied on society's distrust of prisoners in find-
ing that inmates had no fourth amendment right to be free from unrea-
sonable searches. 230 As a result, in the absence of legislative protection
of an inmate's privacy right, only extreme deprivations of a prisoner's
right of privacy would be redressed by a court. For example, in Hodges
v. Klein,231 the prisoner was subjected to restricted confinement without
a hearing. The court, in denying the prisoner's section 1983 claim, found
that it would not second-guess the warden's judgment on matters of in-
227. 416 U.S. 663 (1974). In Calero-Toledo, appellee was lessor of a yacht upon which
marijuana was found. The yacht was seized by the Superintendent of Police and forfeited to
the government. The lessor asserted that the seizure and forfeiture of the yacht violated due
process of law because he was not given advance notice of the seizure and because he was
unaware of the marijuana on board. Id. at 665-68. The Court rejected the argument that due
process requires notification prior to the seizure and forfeiture of an individual's property. Id.
at 677.
228. Id. at 689-90 (citations omitted).
229. See supra notes 221-26 and accompanying text.
230. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3201.
231. 421 F. Supp. 1224 (D.N.J. 1976), affTd, 562 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1977).
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ternal prison security.2 32 In Hudson, even assuming that Palmer was not
barred by sovereign immunity, a Virginia court would not likely take his
word over the word of the prison administration.2"' By denying
Palmer's section 1983 claim, the Court has forced Palmer into attempt-
ing to redress his grievance in the potentially unfriendly courts of Vir-
ginia. As the Court stated in Logan, "[s]eeking redress through a tort
suit is apt to be a lengthy and speculative process.... ,234 If Palmer is
barred from an action by sovereign immunity, he will have suffered the
destruction of his personal property without a hearing and without a
remedy, a violation of the due process clause.235
The Court's decision not only affects Palmer. Now that the Court
has effectively immunized guards and the state from fourteenth amend-
ment scrutiny, guards will be able to indiscriminately seize and destroy
an inmate's personal property. The only limitation on the guard's ac-
tions is the possibility of a civil suit in a state court. However, the
chances of an inmate's recovery are so slim as to have very little deterrent
effect on a guard's conduct.23 6 The result is to sanction deprivations of
property like that inflicted on Palmer. In effect, the Court has taken
away the inmate's right not to be deprived of property without due pro-
cess of law.
Seemingly, the Court's decision to remove Palmer's due process
right was unnecessary. Since property seizures are normally part of an
established prison procedure, 237 pre-deprivation hearings could be held
between prison guards and administrators. If the guard suspects that an
inmate's property threatens institutional security, a request to seize the
property could be given to prison administrators. An opportunity should
then be given the inmate to rebut the guard's charge. If exigent circum-
stances warrant, the inmate's property could be seized and a hearing
could then be conducted. Prior to the destruction of the property, a
hearing could be held which would ensure that the prisoner receives due
process. This type of procedure could have prevented Palmer's noncon-
traband property from being destroyed because Palmer could have ex-
plained to the prison administration the contents of the property seized.
232. Id. at 1231.
233. See infra note 234 and accompanying text.
234. Logan, 455 U.S. at 436-37.
235. See supra note 220.
236. Guards are well situated to individually and in collusion destroy and/or cover up evi-
dence relating to the destruction of an inmate's property.
237. Logan, 455 U.S. at 436.
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2. Fourth amendment
Prior to Hudson v. Palmer, the Court had identified as independent
the two expectations guaranteed by the fourth amendment.238 Yet, the
Court had never used the seizure clause to vindicate an inmate's posses-
sory interest in property. Justice Stevens cited no cases when he stated
that "the Fourth Amendment protects Palmer's possessory interests in
this property entirely apart from whatever privacy interest he may have
in it."' 239 While Justice Stevens conceded that the search of Palmer's cell
did not violate the fourth amendment," and the seizure did not violate
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,241 he found objec-
tionable the fact that Hudson seized and destroyed Palmer's noncontra-
band personal property. 42
In dissent, Justice Stevens was correct in finding the seizure and de-
struction of Palmer's letters and legal materials unconstitutional. They
were seized for no reason save to harass Palmer; they were destroyed for
the same reason. Since the constitution forbids treating letters and legal
materials as contraband, 43 and the Court agreed that Hudson's actions
were intolerable, the seizure was unreasonable. 244 Even applying the
Court's institutional security test, the seizure was unreasonable. Assum-
ing Palmer's letters and legal materials passed through prison screening
procedures and were determined not to be contraband, there was no jus-
tification for finding that the seizure of these items served to protect insti-
tutional security.245
Unfortunately, Justice Stevens' innovative argument may remain
confined to dissenting opinions. With the recent trend away from grant-
238. The fourth amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. For the
pertinent text of the fourth amendment, see supra note 20.
239. Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3209 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
240. Id. at 3208 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens found that "[tihe Court correctly
concludes that the imperatives of prison administration require random searches of prison cells
." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
241. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens observed that "I agree that Palmer's com-
plaint does not allege a violation of his constitutional right to procedural due process." Id.
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
242. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated that:
[t]he reasoning in... the Court's opinion, [dealing with the fourth amendment's
proscriptions] however, is seriously flawed-indeed, internally inconsistent ....
[T]he Court... holds that no matter how malicious, destructive or arbitrary a cell
search and seizure may be, it cannot constitute an unreasonable invasion of any pri-
vacy or possessory interest that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
243. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3212 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
244. Id. at 3211-12 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
245. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ing inmates fourth amendment protection,2 46 his approach is not likely to
be adopted in addressing the issue of an inmate's property deprivation.
Thus, the Court will likely continue to ignore the fourth amendment's
applicability to unreasonable seizures of an inmate's property.
V. CONCLUSION
Hudson v. Palmer is inconsistent with the Wolff v. McDonnell
Court's finding that "[t]here is no iron curtain drawn between the Consti-
tution and the prisons of this country. '24 7 Regarding the fourth amend-
ment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures, and the
fourteenth amendment's guarantee of due process of law for property
deprivations, the Hudson Court found these protections to be nonexistent
for prisoners. The Court's analysis was based on security threats which
did not exist, and precedent that should have been distinguished. A cor-
rect application of fourth and fourteenth amendment law would have
labeled the search of Palmer's cell unreasonable, and the seizure and de-
struction of Palmer's letters and legal materials as violative of basic con-
stitutional rights available to all citizens.
Robert M, Hartmann
246. See supra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
247. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56.
